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Whitehall’s Top-Secret Anti-Communist
Committee and the Evolution of British Covert
Action Strategy
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Introduction
With the prospect of a direct U.S.-Soviet military confrontation inhibited by
the advent of nuclear deterrence, the Cold War became in part an intelligence
war. The multifaceted role of intelligence, however, extended far beyond the
passive realm of watching the Communist militaries and counting their nu-
clear warheads. Intelligence also encompassed an active event-shaping dimen-
sion. Academic (and popular) literature is replete with discussions of the ac-
tive use of intelligence agencies in the context of U.S. and Soviet Cold War
policies, notably the covert exploits of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) and the Soviet State Security Committee (KGB).1 By contrast, analyses
of British intelligence have traditionally been limited to the passive sphere.2
Yet, for the British, as for the Americans, covert operations, propaganda, and
subversion quickly became the weapons of choice.
1. For recent examples of broader overviews, see James Callanan, Covert Action in the Cold War: US
Policy, Intelligence, and CIA Operations (London: IB Tauris, 2010); Sarah-Jane Corke, US Covert Oper-
ations and Cold War Strategy: Truman, Secret Warfare, and the CIA, 1945–1953 (New York: Routledge,
2008); and John Prados, Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2009).
There is also a great deal of literature on the CIA covering speciªc aspects of Cold War covert action.
For examples, see A. Ross Johnson, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty: The CIA Years and Beyond
(Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2010); and Frances Stoner Saunders, The Cultural
Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters (New York: The New Press, 1999).
2. Although British intelligence has been the subject of a great deal of excellent scholarship over the
last twenty years, it has traditionally been understood as a predominantly passive entity. See, for exam-
ple, Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in War and Peace (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press, 1996), which, despite being a superb, ground-breaking book, contains little mention of special
operations within the context of intelligence (perhaps in part because Herman’s role as a former senior
British intelligence ofªcial might curtail his leeway to discuss such matters publicly).
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Toward the end of the 1940s, as the East-West ideological conºict in-
tensiªed, the central role of intelligence became increasingly apparent to se-
nior ofªcials in Whitehall, especially within the Ministry of Defence and ex-
tending to the very top of government. Clement Attlee, Britain’s ªrst Cold
War prime minister, is traditionally portrayed as a skeptic of the merits of co-
vert activity—someone reluctant to become embroiled in a murky world he
associated with the dirty tricks used by the Bolsheviks.3 The common view is
that after a brief and reluctant ºirtation with covert operations (involving an
abortive attempt to aid anti-Communist guerrillas in Albania), Attlee shied
away from such provocative tactics.4 However, recently declassiªed top-secret
papers challenge this orthodoxy. Under Attlee’s premiership, the British gov-
ernment relied on covert action on a striking (and hitherto unacknowledged)
geographic scale from Europe to the Far East and Southeast Asia, from the
Middle East to even Latin America.5 Attlee oversaw a covert action strategy
that lasted until the dying days of his premiership and that went on to
inºuence future British administrations.
Focusing on covert activity behind the Iron Curtain, this article argues
that far from shying away from covert operations in the aftermath of the Alba-
nian misadventure, the British government simply changed tactics. The arti-
cle reveals, for the ªrst time, how a select group of senior Whitehall ofªcials,
including the chief of Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), devised a
new strategy for covert operations behind the Iron Curtain: the “pinprick ap-
proach.” This concept was approved by the prime minister himself in Decem-
ber 1950. The pinprick approach saw the number of operations increase at
the start of the 1950s, although they were of a more limited nature than pre-
vious failed attempts to liberate Albania.
This article begins by brieºy outlining the evolution of British covert ac-
tion strategy in the formative years of the Cold War. From 1947 to 1950,
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3. Richard J. Aldrich, The Hidden Hand: Britain, America, and Cold War Secret Intelligence (New York:
The Overlook Press, 2002), p. 79. This view can perhaps be traced back to a ground-breaking, inºu-
ential article by John Zametica and Raymond Smith in the 1980s. The authors attempted to
reconceptualize Attlee and argued that his “cold warrior clothes tailored by the orthodox school of his-
tory [which, according to the authors, saw Attlee as a Cold Warrior par excellence] appeared extremely
ill-ªtting.” See Raymond Smith and John Zametica, “The Cold Warrior: Clement Attlee Recon-
sidered, 1945–7,” International Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 2 (Spring 1985), p. 237.
4. Philip Davies, MI6 and the Machinery of Spying (London: Frank Cass, 2004), p. 219; and Richard J.
Aldrich, “British Intelligence and the Anglo-American ‘Special Relationship’ during the Cold War,”
Review of International Studies, Vol. 24, No. 3 (July 1998), pp. 339–340.
5. See, for example, the agenda of a meeting of the Ofªcial Committee on Communism (Overseas), or
AC(O), in the autumn of 1950, which covers Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East, in AC(O)
Minutes, 6 September 1950, in The National Archives (TNA) of the United Kingdom, CAB 134/4,
AC(O)(50)25th Meeting. The papers of the AC(O) found in TNA, CAB 134/2–4, are remarkably
broad in geographical scope. In the interests of space, this article focuses exclusively on activity in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe.
British thinking was somewhat muddled and encompassed caution, libera-
tion, and national deviationism. The article then provides the ªrst detailed ac-
count of the creation and functioning of a new counter-subversion body—the
Ofªcial Committee on Communism (Overseas) or AC(O), which was de-
signed to take the offensive against the Soviet Union in the clandestine Cold
War. The next section uses recent archival releases to explore the new pinprick
approach to covert action. I ªrst consider the approach as a whole and then
focus on certain schemes, showing how the new approach ªt into the trans-
atlantic relationship. Finally, the article assesses the strategic coherence of the
AC(O) and the pinprick approach, as well as their impact on British Cold
War strategy. The article shows that the Attlee government planned covert
operations behind the Iron Curtain to a greater extent than has hitherto been
acknowledged, that British ofªcials had an overarching strategy for ªghting
the secret war, and that even though certain ºaws in the AC(O) ultimately
led to its dissolution, the clandestine body proved a useful step in the right
direction.
The Muddled Evolution of Covert Action
The British government was cautious at the outbreak of the Cold War. No
lasting consensus emerged between the diplomats and the military about the
scale of the threat. Not until July 1948 did the Joint Intelligence Committee
(JIC) assert that the Soviet Union was an expansionist power driven by a mili-
tant ideology with the aim of eliminating capitalism.6 The prime minister ini-
tially tended to downplay the Soviet threat and apparently did not make up
his mind about its severity until 1947.7 Although certain ofªcials, particularly
within the military (but also in the Foreign Ofªce), pushed hard for the use of
covert operations against the emerging Communist threat shortly after the
end of the Second World War, senior politicians did not authorize any sub-
stantial expansion of such activity until 1948.8 Debates about the necessity
7
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6. Percy Cradock, Know Your Enemy: How the Joint Intelligence Committee Saw the World (London:
John Murray, 2002), pp. 26–27.
7. For discussions about Attlee’s evolving attitudes toward the Soviet Union and the Cold War, see Pe-
ter Hennessy, The Prime Minister: The Ofªce and Its Holders since 1945 (London: Penguin, 2001),
pp. 166–167; Francis Beckett, Clem Attlee: A Biography (London: Richard Cohen, 1997), p. 231;
Robert Pearce, Attlee (Essex, UK: Longman, 1997), p. 164; and Mark Phythian, The Labour Party,
War and International Relations, 1945–2006 (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 25.
8. John Slessor of the Royal Air Force was particularly vocal in his lobbying for aggressive forms of co-
vert action. Slessor pushed for “using every weapon from bribery to kidnapping—anything short of as-
sassination.” Continuing along this vein over the coming year, Slessor’s arguments increasingly irri-
tated Ernest Bevin. His zeal, the foreign secretary later moaned to Attlee, had “rather outrun both his
knowledge and his judgement.” See John Slessor to Basil Liddell Hart, 22 January 1948, in TNA, AIR
and utility of covert action were very much framed within the ongoing argu-
ment between the Foreign Ofªce and the military about the Soviet threat.
Threat assessments were vital when considering covert action, for such opera-
tions were a risky business, to be employed only when necessary.
A further framework shaping the debate was the legacy of the Second
World War. Britain had gained valuable experience in covert action through
the Special Operations Executive (SOE), created in 1940 with orders to “set
Europe ablaze.” But as the war wound down, heated debate surrounded the
future of special operations. Although senior military and SOE ªgures pressed
for the continuation of such activity within a single entity, the diplomats tri-
umphed and SOE was dissolved, with any residual capabilities being absorbed
by MI6.9 The Foreign Ofªce had acquired control over the peacetime use of
special operations. The chiefs of staff feared that the diplomats intended to
use their newfound veto “rather drastically.”10 Sir Alexander Cadogan, the
permanent undersecretary at the Foreign Ofªce, failed to dampen these wor-
ries when he stated that “the requirements of war or of an ‘amber’ light period
were totally different from what would be reasonable in peacetime.”11 Despite
British wartime successes in special operations, Foreign Ofªce control en-
sured a more cautious postwar approach.
As the Cold War heated up, Whitehall undertook an increase in propa-
ganda activities, albeit with severe limitations. Attlee’s foreign secretary, Ernest
Bevin, had banned the use of propaganda to incite subversion in countries al-
ready under Communist control and initially limited his support to propa-
ganda that highlighted the UK’s positive achievements rather than anything
that criticized the Soviet Union.12 Vetoing ideas for a peacetime psychological
warfare unit in 1946, Bevin made clear that he preferred a more positive op-
tion extolling the virtues of Britain as “the Third Force.” That is, he wanted to
promote Labour’s brand of Social Democracy as a rose between the thornier
(and ideologically more rigid) Soviet Union and United States.13 Meanwhile,
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75/116; and Ernest Bevin to Clement Attlee, 19 April 1949, in TNA, PREM 8/1365, PM/49/69.
Certain ªgures within the Foreign Ofªce, however, were also pushing for a more forward approach.
See, for example, Christopher Warner’s report calling for a “defensive-offensive” policy: Christopher
Warner, “The Soviet Campaign against This Country and Our Response to It,” 2 April 1946, in
TNA, FO 371/56832.
9. For a more detailed overview, see Keith Jeffery, MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service
(London: Bloomsbury, 2010), pp. 626–630; and Philip Davies, “From Special Operations to Special
Political Action: The ‘Rump’ SOE and SIS Post-War Covert Action Capability, 1945–1977,” Intelli-
gence and National Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (2002), pp. 55–76.
10. Chiefs of Staff, “Extract from Conclusion of COS(46)12th Meeting, held on 23rd January 1946,”
in TNA, AIR 19/816.
11. Ibid.
12. Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, p. 151.
13. Stephen Dorril, MI6: Fifty Years of Special Operations (London: Fourth Estate, 2000), p. 72.
the chairman of Whitehall’s newly-formed Russia Committee, which was de-
signed to coordinate Soviet policy, urged restraint. He called for the need to
restrict covert action to “the really essential cases and countries.”14
Encompassing the Communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia
and the start of the Berlin blockade, the year 1948 saw a marked intensiªcat-
ion of the Cold War. With increasingly stark intelligence assessments emerg-
ing about an expansionist USSR, covert action became a more attractive
option for Britain’s senior politicians and diplomats.15 By the end of 1948 am-
bitious liberation operations were on the agenda. Although Whitehall ofªcials
still deemed it “not worth while” to target the Soviet Union itself, the Russia
Committee (which by then included a representative of the combative Chiefs
of Staff ) secretly pondered how to foment a civil war behind the Iron Curtain,
agreeing that “our aim should certainly be to liberate the countries within the
Soviet Orbit by any means short of war.”16 They deemed Albania an appropri-
ate target, not least because the Soviet-Yugoslav schism had isolated Albania
geographically from the Soviet bloc. Both Attlee and Bevin actively supported
the idea.17 The prime minister called for the bribery of signiªcant Albanian
personalities in order to undermine the regime, and Bevin advocated “any
suitable means” to harass the regime and ultimately to “detach Albania from
the Orbit.”18 Moreover, planning for liberation in Albania did not exist in iso-
lation. The intelligence historian Richard Aldrich has revealed that by 1948,
MI6 (in conjunction with its U.S. counterparts) had begun to make serious
efforts to exploit resistance movements in Soviet Ukraine and Poland.19
Liberation notoriously failed, however. Consequently, British thinking
about covert activity had to adapt. After the ill-fated dalliance with liberation,
confusion again arose about parameters and how far the British should go. In-
deed, the Whitehall ªles demonstrate a lack of clear thinking and much con-
tradiction among various ofªcials. Within the Foreign Ofªce, a planning
body known as the Permanent Under-Secretary’s Committee (PUSC) out-
lined an innovative approach in the summer of 1949: to encourage national
deviationism.20 The idea was to act quickly and foster nationalist resistance in
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14. Russia Committee Minutes, 18 June 1946, in TNA, FO 371/56885.
15. Cradock, Know Your Enemy, pp. 26–27.
16. “Report of the Sub-committee Set Up to Examine the Problem of Planning in Relation to Policy
towards the Soviet Union and the Soviet Orbit,” 14 December 1948, in TNA, FO 371/70272,
RC(25)48; and Russia Committee Minutes, 25 November 1948, in TNA, FO 371/1687.
17. Jeffery, MI6, p. 712.
18. Attlee, handwritten note on William Strang to Attlee, 26 March 1949, in TNA, FO 800/437;
Strang to Attlee, 26 March 1949, in TNA, FO 800/437; and Russia Committee Minutes, 15 February
1949, in TNA, FO 371/77623.
19. Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, pp. 165–166.
20. The PUSC was a planning body ostensibly considering long-term policy. Its discussions were more
those areas into which the Soviet Union had expanded but had not yet fully
consolidated a Communist political system.21 The PUSC hoped this ap-
proach would obstruct the Sovietization of Eastern Europe.
Demonstrating the confused thinking within Whitehall, the PUSC pro-
posal came just weeks after other ofªcials were reafªrming the ban on subver-
sive activity behind the Iron Curtain.22 Elsewhere in Whitehall, more hawkish
Cold Warriors continued to call for “such measures as the promotion of de-
fection and sabotage, and the encouragement of dissident and resistance
groups.”23 By contrast, the Foreign Ofªce sought only to “weaken the Soviet
grip on the European satellite States before their peoples become so imbued
with Soviet propaganda as to follow the lead of the Soviet Government with-
out demur.” Tactics to achieve this goal were to include, among other things,
“covert activities.” Instead of liberation, therefore, Britain sought to under-
mine the Soviet Union and “to encourage the emergence of ‘national devi-
ationism’ in the other orbit countries.” Although “every opportunity should
be taken to weaken Russian control over the satellite States,” the Foreign
Ofªce explicitly stated that “actions involving a serious risk of war or likely to
encourage futile resistance should be avoided.”24 The British approach to co-
vert action had thus reached a crossroads.
Britain’s Covert Action Committee
In December 1949 a new, highly secretive Whitehall committee was created:
the Ofªcial Committee on Communism (Overseas). The AC(O), or Jebb
Committee as it became known, was so highly classiªed that its functions and
papers have only recently come to light (albeit with heavy redactions).25 The
AC(O) was joined by a ministerial equivalent, the Ministerial Committee on
10
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sensitive than the committee acknowledged, however, for it served the Permanent Under-Secretary’s
Department (PUSD). Subsuming the functions of the wartime Services Liaison Department, the
PUSD was created by Bevin in 1949 and enjoyed responsibility over intelligence and other covert
matters. See Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, p. 157.
21. “British Policy towards Soviet Communism,” 28 July 1949, in TNA, FO 800/503, PUSC(31)Fi-
nal.
22. The government resolved in June 1949 that “present policy was not to permit any subversive activ-
ities in the Iron Curtain countries.” See Cabinet Committee on Communism Minutes, 7 June 1949,
in TNA, CAB 134/53, C(49)3rd Meeting.
23. “British Policy towards Russia and Planning in Connexion with Policy towards Russia: Memoran-
dum by the Russia Committee,” 8 June 1949, in TNA, CAB 134/53, C(49)5.
24. “British Policy towards Soviet Communism,” 28 July 1949.
25. Credit should also go to Chikara Hashimoto, a doctoral candidate at Aberystwyth University, for
his efforts in getting some of the material declassiªed. The designation “Jebb Committee” refers to the
committee’s Foreign Ofªce chairman, Gladwyn Jebb. In 1950 the committee became known as the
Dixon Committee when Sir Pierson Dixon took it over.
Communism, or AC(M).26 These two inºuential bodies instantly became in-
tegral to Britain’s covert Cold War and represented what one ofªcial described
as the government “turning towards the idea of competing with the Kremlin
in the matter of subversion.”27 Yet, owing to their intense secrecy, the two
bodies have so far escaped any serious discussion in the literature.
Operating at the civil servant level, the AC(O) was maintained at extreme
levels of secrecy. At one point Norman Brook, the cabinet secretary, even felt
the need to curb the practice of informally referring to the committee by its
chairman’s name. Given the committee’s highly sensitive business, association
with a particular person could cause both embarrassment and potential secu-
rity risks. The AC(O) was charged with stimulating, coordinating, and initi-
ating the UK’s anti-Communist activities overseas. The ªles of this Cold War
covert action committee, despite being heavily redacted, form an indubitable
gold mine of political warfare, counter-subversion, and special operations.
The AC(O) met at least monthly throughout 1950. Although set up as an in-
terdepartmental committee, it was kept as small as possible. The committee
brought together only a handful of the most senior Cold Warriors from the
Foreign Ofªce, the Ministry of Defence, the Chiefs of Staff, and MI6. One
such member was the JIC chairman, Patrick Reilly. His inclusion started an
interesting pattern linking the JIC chairman to covert action. By the 1960s
later heads of the JIC were chairing a shadowy successor to the AC(O) known
as the Joint Action Committee.28 The line between intelligence and covert ac-
tion in the British system was somewhat blurred.
As covert action expanded, however, and as more departments learned
about the AC(O)’s existence, representatives from the Commonwealth Rela-
tions Ofªce, the Colonial Ofªce, and MI5 became “constant attenders” of the
committee’s meetings as of July 1950, June 1951, and February 1953, respec-
tively. The AC(O) considered various schemes, and those it recommended
were submitted to the ministerial committee for approval. Once approved,
the action was sent back to the AC(O), which assigned the requisite tasks to
the relevant department or departments.29
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26. A corresponding committee dealing with Communism at home was established the following year
after initially being rejected. The papers of the Ofªcial Committee on Communism (Home) can be
found in TNA, CAB 134/737–40.
27. John Ward (Foreign Ofªce) to Air Marshall William Elliott, Attached: “‘Deception’ Organisa-
tion,” 20 February 1950, in TNA, DEFE 28/1.
28. Rory Cormac, “Coordinating Covert Action: The Case of the Yemen Civil War and the South
Arabian Insurgency,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 36, No. 5 (2013), pp. 692–717; and Richard J.
Aldrich, Rory Cormac, and Michael S. Goodman, eds., Spying on the World: The Declassiªed Docu-
ments of the Joint Intelligence Committee, 1936–2013 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014),
pp. 427–428.
29. “Draft Memorandum for Communication by HM Minister in Washington to the US Authorities
Concerning Anglo-US Cooperation in Anti-Communist Activities,” 13 February 1950, in TNA,
The AC(M), sitting above the AC(O), was chaired by Prime Minister
Attlee and included Labour heavyweights Lord President Herbert Morrison,
Foreign Secretary Bevin, Chancellor of the Exchequer Hugh Dalton, and
Minister of Defence A. V. Alexander. Highly secretive and meeting only
rarely, the AC(M) was charged with the general supervision of major policy
relating to anti-Communist activities.30
The Pinprick Strategy
National archives are veritable treasure troves of material, and declassiªcations
can unearth whole new committees. Such discoveries can excite the historian,
but the so what question remains. What impact did the AC(O) have on Brit-
ish covert strategy in the early 1950s? What were its strengths and weaknesses?
What does it reveal about Whitehall’s conceptualization of the Cold War and
the place of covert operations within it? Fortunately, the committee’s papers
help us to answer these questions, shedding valuable light on Britain’s ap-
proach to covert action.
Despite the failed operation in Albania in the late 1940s, which under-
lined the strategic incoherence of liberation, proposals for covert schemes in-
creased in 1950 under the direction of the AC(O). Even though the Soviet
Union’s acquisition of nuclear weapons in August 1949 had underlined the
dangers of provocation and escalation, the UK was going on the counter-
offensive. British ofªcials called for a full exploration of possible actions and
put out a call for covert action proposals to British missions across the world.
They were “ready to consider any scheme” from Ankara to Warsaw, from
Bangkok to Santiago.31 Heads of missions overseas were informed that
for some time we have been thinking about extending the scope of our anti-
communist activities overseas into ªelds other than those of propaganda, and
have been considering what could be done by economic and other means (not
excluding subversive and clandestine operations) to forestall and counteract the
12
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CAB 21/2750, AC(O)(50)3; and AC(O) Minutes, 25 January 1950, in TNA, CAB 134/4,
AC(O)(50)1st Meeting.
30. “Composition and Terms of Reference,” 31 December 1949, in TNA, CAB 21/2992,
AC(M)(49)1.
31. “Planning Staff for Cold War Activities,” 19 July 1950, in TNA, CAB 134/3, AC(O)(50)35;
AC(O) Minutes, 26 May 1950, in TNA, CAB 134/3, AC(O)(50)17th Meeting;”Planning Staff for
Cold War Activities,” Attached: “Draft Letter to Heads of Missions,” 19 July 1950, in TNA, CAB
134/3, AC(O)(50)35; and AC(O) Minutes, 7 June 1950, in TNA, CAB 134/3, AC(O)(50)19th
Meeting.
spread of Communism, and to hamper the activities of Communist Parties and
Governments, wherever such intervention seems likely to yield dividends.32
Crucially, however, the strategy had evolved, and the increase in schemes had
come in terms of number rather than ambition. The new approach was less
provocative, of lesser scope, and of narrower objective than the earlier Albanian
operation. Indeed, British covert activity in 1950 and 1951 was characterized
by “pinpricks.” The pinprick approach, apparently coined by MI6 Chief Stew-
art Menzies in February 1950 and endorsed by the AC(O) the same month,
was adopted to test proposals for covert action and gradually chip away at So-
viet control by exploiting political weaknesses, targeting economic vulnerabili-
ties, promoting dissension, and spreading distrust.33 The hope was that limited
strikes against select targets in individual countries would sow the seeds of dis-
sension. The aim was not liberation (although the UK remained keen to main-
tain a spirit of resistance behind the Iron Curtain) but gradually to make the
satellite states a liability rather than an asset and “in general to make things as
difªcult as possible for the Communist Governments.”34 With few resources
and an inherent caution, the new strategy was more cost-efªcient and less risky
than either launching an ambitious covert intervention to liberate a satellite
state or directly attacking the Soviet Union itself. Instead, Menzies built on an
earlier idea that “getting at individual satellite territories” would offer the best
chance of “weakening the whole Soviet system.”35
Covert schemes against the Soviet bloc increased—but with less scope for
escalation to a global nuclear war. Regarding clandestine economic action,
for example, the British government did not fear reprisals per se. The
Soviet Union was already doing everything it could to damage British eco-
nomic growth. No one in Whitehall feared that Moscow would resort to a nu-
clear strike over small-scale economic operations in Czechoslovakia.36 More
broadly, the pinprick approach was cautious and incremental in nature,
thereby reducing the risk of provocation, escalation, and retaliation. The ap-
proach involved experiments and pilot schemes with limited objectives to test
and probe the target in order to determine whether conditions were favorable
13
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32. “Planning Staff for Cold War Activities,” Attached: “Draft Letter to Heads of Missions,” 19 July
1950.
33. AC(O) Minutes, 15 February 1950, in TNA, CAB 134/4, AC(O)(50)4th Meeting.
34. “The Work of the Ofªcial Committee on Communism (Overseas),” 23 June 1951, in TNA, CAB
134/2, AC(M)(51)4.
35. “Report of the Sub-committee Set Up to Examine the Problem of Planning in Relation to Policy
towards the Soviet Union and the Soviet Orbit,” 14 December 1948.
36. AC(O) Minutes, 9 March 1950, in TNA, CAB 134/4, AC(O)(50)7th Meeting.
for successful covert action.37 Covert activity was to be conducted behind the
Iron Curtain on a small scale, but “it might, if properly carried out, lead to
greater things in the future.” Therefore senior ofªcials looked into “certain
minor practical activities” recommended by MI6. “There was nothing to lose
by such activities, and if successful, they might well throw grit into the ma-
chine of the Communist regimes.”38
Accordingly, the committee described its proposals as “necessarily limited
in scope” and “in the nature of an experiment.”39 Brook informed Attlee that
the proposals were on a modest scale and were put forward as “the most likely
activities to produce a reasonable return for the money and effort expended
on them.” Attlee was informed that, if successful, the AC(O) would make fur-
ther proposals for an extension of covert action based on the results.40 Brook
submitted the AC(O)’s proposals, which were treated with “special secrecy,”
to Attlee and his AC(M) in mid-December 1950.41 Within a week the minis-
terial committee had approved them.42 The new strategy was under way.
This British brand of covert action explicitly did not involve violent spe-
cial operations and sabotage, the type of which was conducted by the SOE
during World War II.43 Diplomats associated such action with the wartime
context and deemed it inappropriate for peacetime. Caution existed for prac-
tical reasons too. JIC Chairman Patrick Reilly, one of the Foreign Ofªce’s
leading lights in intelligence and covert activity, ruled out physical sabotage
against Czechoslovak factories. This was for the simple (and valid) reason that
it “would probably lead to savage reprisals.”44 Eighteen months earlier, the
Russia Committee had recommended “the promotion of . . . sabotage,” but in
the period after Soviet acquisition of nuclear weapons, pinpricks were very
much the way forward.45
The pinprick approach that took shape under Attlee outlasted his admin-
14
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37. AC(O) Minutes, 15 February 1950.
38. Ibid.
39. “Proposed Activities behind the Iron Curtain” (Third Revise), November 1950, in TNA, CAB 21/
2750, AC(O)(50)52.
40. Brook to Attlee, “Meeting of the Ministerial Committee on Communism, 21st December 1950,”
20 December 1950, in TNA, PREM 8/1365.
41. “Anti-Communist Activities in Europe,” 15 December 1950, in TNA, CAB 132/2, AC(M)(50)1.
42. Prime Minister’s Ofªce to Cliffe (Secretary of AC(O)), 21 December 1950, in TNA, PREM
8/1365; and “Anti-Communist Activities in Europe,” 22 December 1950, in TNA, CAB 134/2,
AC(M)(50)2.
43. “Proposed Activities behind the Iron Curtain” (Third Revise), November 1950; and Cliffe to
Brook, 20 December 1950, Attached: “Brief for Prime Minister Ahead of AC(M) Meeting,” in TNA,
CAB 21/5003.
44. AC(O) Minutes, 1 March 1950, in TNA, CAB 134/4, AC(O)(50)6th Meeting.
45. “British Policy towards Russia and Planning in Connexion with Policy towards Russia: Memoran-
dum by the Russia Committee,” 8 June 1949.
istration. Similar ideas informed Foreign Ofªce thinking in the early months
of Winston Churchill’s second premiership. Outlining Britain’s approach to
covert activity to his U.S. counterparts in December 1951, Patrick Reilly
warned that “the British were inclined to think that at this dangerous time the
Soviets should not be ‘pushed too far’ in those areas [the satellite states],
which might cause violent reactions by the USSR.” The new Conservative
government, according to Reilly, had realized that it needed to be “extremely
careful,” a point accentuated by internal British politics during the 1951 elec-
tion campaign. Churchill had been accused by Labour of leading “a gang of
war mongers.”46
Similarly, in a memorandum of early 1952 that angered U.S. ofªcials for
being too complacent, static, and timid, the Foreign Ofªce differentiated be-
tween mass uprisings and “a series of specialist operations against speciªc tar-
gets.”47 The former was off the table, but the latter—an articulation of the
pinprick approach—was very much on it. “These targets,” the diplomats ex-
plained, “would be the Communist Government machine in the various
countries of the orbit including the Soviet Union and above all the Soviet
Army, which is, in the last resort, the essential factor in holding together the
Soviet empire.”48 Having listed the dangers and disadvantages of liberation
operations, the PUSC concluded that “none of the foregoing objections to
mass resistance movements applies at any stage to specialist operations de-
signed either to disrupt the machinery of government or the economic struc-
ture of the satellite States, or to poison relations between the satellite Govern-
ments and the Soviet Union.”49
Numerous schemes spanning much of the range of covert options came
into fruition from late 1950. These included political action, economic ac-
tion, and black propaganda. One of the early schemes approved by Bevin was
covert activity against the German police (Volkspolizei) in the Soviet Zone of
Germany.50 This involved attempts to erode the morale of ofªcers, combined
with measures to “incriminate the senior ofªcers in the eyes of the Russian
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security police.” Through such measures, the British hoped to “undermine
the conªdence of the Russians in the loyalty and efªciency of this force.”51
Other clandestine schemes targeted Soviet forces in Austria and Germany. Lo-
cal nationals were employed on a program to spread dissension among the
“Red Armies of Occupation.” To achieve this, “real or ‘notional’ dissident
groups” were set up to distribute clandestine propaganda designed to “mislead
and confuse” the security services and encourage defection.52
Pinpricks extended to economic action. Measures against individual sat-
ellite economies used as part of a broader policy of overt pressure, would, Brit-
ish ofªcials hoped, yield proªtable results. Accordingly (and again demon-
strating the tentative and incremental approach to covert activity), the AC(O)
called for a pilot operation against one country. The pilot operation, accord-
ing to Patrick Reilly, ensured that British efforts would not be scattered or
overextended at the outset. The pilot-scheme approach was also sensible be-
cause such covert action was unchartered territory for the British in peace-
time. Even the most senior ofªcials planning covert action acknowledged that
they “could not have any real idea of what operations would be effective in the
satellite countries until [they are] tried.” This approach thus provided a valu-
able opportunity for the British to learn “the technique and limitations of the
business.”53
Czechoslovakia was chosen as the target of the “experiment” because it
was deemed particularly important to the Soviet Union but offered the easiest
chance of success for the British. Suggestions included encouraging industry
to “go slow,” encouraging defections among technicians, attacking the cur-
rency, and making capital out of the government-sponsored return of Ger-
mans from the Eastern Zone of the Sudetenland.54 The Joint Intelligence Bu-
reau and the Foreign Ofªce’s Economic Intelligence Department were
subsequently asked to draw up a list of weak spots in the Czechoslovak econ-
omy that could be exploited by “direct action.”55
The extent to which this effort proceeded is unclear, but by 1951 minis-
ters had approved proposals “to hamper the activities of Communist Govern-
ments in the economic ªeld.”56 Discussion had begun about covert preemp-
tive or selective buying at the start of the year. A tactic associated with
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economic warfare, selective buying was not deemed an option to be used reg-
ularly. MI6 conªrmed, however, that such action would work in exceptional
circumstances and that in some cases “the western authorities can either by
open purchase, or covertly, through reliable intermediaries, cause considerable
embarrassment to Eastern European purchasing agencies and upset the econ-
omy of the Soviet Orbit in Europe.”57
Such discussion and any associated action took place against the work-
ings of the newly-formed Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export
Controls (COCOM), which restricted exports to Communist countries.58
Meeting for the ªrst time in January 1950, COCOM included Britain, the
United States, and seventeen other Western countries and was designed to co-
ordinate Allied export controls. The idea of economic warfare was, however,
beset with disagreements. Internally, the British Ministry of Defence and the
Foreign Ofªce sought an embargo on anything that could contribute to So-
viet war potential, whereas the economic departments sought to limit the
banned list to military equipment (Britain relied on timber and grain from
Eastern Europe). Externally, disagreements existed between London and
Washington about the aggressiveness of the action—with the former prefer-
ring a modest strategic embargo.59
The British government sought to develop secret channels of communi-
cation to permit disruptive operations in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and prob-
ably Poland. This involved the dissemination of black propaganda “ostensibly
produced by dissident elements inside the countries concerned,” as well as
“publications produced by refugee groups and apparently disseminated by
their own organisations.” On top of this, whispering campaigns designed to
compromise Communist ofªcials were ready to be implemented.60
The use of propaganda, which was integral to the pinprick approach,
demonstrated a sense of continuity throughout the Attlee years. The Informa-
tion Research Department (the Foreign Ofªce’s propaganda unit) had been
created earlier in 1948. Propaganda operations provided their own attacks on
Communism but were also often used in conjunction with other forms of co-
vert political and economic activity to ensure that schemes worked most effec-
tively. In this sense, black propaganda can be seen as a means of facilitating
covert action. For example, propaganda was planned in conjunction with the
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economic pilot scheme in Czechoslovakia to try to encourage “go slow” ten-
dencies in Czechoslovak industry.61 This idea worked the other way around as
well—special operations were designed to facilitate propaganda. Such tactics
were intended “to ensure that Western and United Nations propaganda
reaches the population of the Satellite countries despite radio jamming.”62
Meanwhile, whispering campaigns to exploit unfolding situations and to
compromise high-ranking ofªcials were also kept as an option—although this
applied more to the Soviet zones of Germany and Austria than to Czechoslo-
vakia.63 The idea continued to feature prominently under the Conservative
government.
Black propaganda, and covert operations more broadly, sought to exploit
what ofªcials described as Communist “contradictions” or rifts. Czechoslova-
kia again offers an instructive example. According to British intelligence, ex-
ploitable disagreements existed between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia
over economic development. Soviet policy had caused a worsening of Czecho-
slovakia’s foreign exchange position and had distorted the Czechoslovak econ-
omy (from consumer goods to heavy industry) to suit Moscow’s own require-
ments, a source of frustration in Prague.64 Hence, British activity included
subversive propaganda to worsen relations with the USSR in the economic
ªeld. Whitehall hoped to sow ªssures in the Soviet bloc by ªnding and publi-
cizing information that had been withheld by Soviet leaders from at least
some of the East European countries.65
Britain’s Pinprick Strategy and the Transatlantic
Alliance
The disagreement between Britain and the United States during the early
Cold War over the virtues of covert action is well-established in the literature
and need not be repeated here. Sufªce to say that Britain’s cautious approach
placed London at loggerheads with more ambitious U.S. thinking, leaving
British strategy consciously attempting to “exert a moderating inºuence [on
the United States] so as to ensure that full account is taken at each stage of the
18
Cormac
61. AC(O) Minutes, 31 March 1950, in TNA, CAB 134/4, AC(O)(50)10th Meeting.
62. “Proposed Activity behind the Iron Curtain” (Third Revise), November 1950.
63. Ibid.
64. “Report of the Sub-committee Set Up to Examine the Problem of Planning in Relation to Policy
towards the Soviet Union and the Soviet Orbit: Appendix B—Satellite Contradictions,” 14 December
1948, in TNA, FO 371/70272, RC(25)48.
65. “Proposed Activity behind the Iron Curtain” (Third Revise), November 1950.
risks involved.”66 Not that this made much difference. Although Churchill
warned U.S. ofªcials not to stir anything in Eastern Europe that could not be
backed up by the West with force if necessary, ofªcials in Washington
deªantly asserted: “We are going ahead with our general plans in this matter,
regardless of British approval.”67
Disagreements aside, the AC(O), like the Russia Committee before it,
was speciªcally instructed to maintain close liaison with Washington.68 U.S.
ofªcials were informed about the existence of the AC(O) reasonably shortly
after it was established—certainly much sooner than other British govern-
ment departments such as the Colonial Ofªce were informed. The U.S. State
Department learned in February 1950 that “subject to the overriding neces-
sity of securing Ministerial approval for schemes that the Ofªcial Committee
recommend, the Committee would wish to cooperate with the competent
United States authorities, both in the exchange of views and in the formula-
tion of speciªc plans.”69 The AC(O) sought to establish some sort of machin-
ery to exchange views in Washington between the British embassy, the State
Department, and the U.S. Ofªce of Policy Coordination. Perhaps somewhat
optimistically, the AC(O) also requested full and up-to-date details of Ameri-
can anti-Communist programs.70
In some ways, however, Britain’s pinprick approach was contingent on
U.S. support. In March 1950, for example, the AC(O) acknowledged that the
opportunities for clandestine economic activity and more general subversive
activities were “largely inºuenced by the attitude of the Americans.”71 Like-
wise, the minutes of the AC(O) a few months later reveal that conversations
with U.S. ofªcials about policy in Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East
were under way. These conversations were intended to decide whether “a
more intensive assault” on Communism was to be launched or whether Brit-
ish efforts should be “relaxed.”72 The strong implication from the records is
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that senior British ofªcials were awaiting either U.S. direction or U.S. ap-
proval of plans. By the end of 1950, Attlee was informed that all British covert
action behind the Iron Curtain was to be carried out in full cooperation with
the United States.73
Assessment of the AC(O) and the Pinprick Strategy
An important caveat worth mentioning is that not all British covert action
from this period has come to light. The released ªles point to a tentative con-
clusion that the pinprick strategy, with its limited objectives, made more stra-
tegic sense and enjoyed greater coherence than its short-lived liberation ante-
cedent. Although the UK Chiefs of Staff continued to argue that British
policy was too defensive, too timid, and too dispersed among a hodgepodge
of committees, the advent of the AC(O)—despite certain ºaws—proved a
step in the right direction.74 A tentative assessment is now feasible of the Brit-
ish approach in four key areas: interdepartmental coherence, strategic sense,
integration with overt policies, and the containment of more dangerous and
hawkish designs.
Ensuring Interdepartmental Coherence
The AC(O) provided a useful forum for the coordination and guidance of co-
vert action. It brought together the key players from the Foreign Ofªce, MI6,
and the military, and its members were well aware of the boundaries of opera-
tions, including the bans on physical sabotage and any direct encouragement
of resistance groups. Such a framework allowed covert operations to be stimu-
lated and planned in a coherent manner and reduced the chances of launch-
ing risky ad hoc sabotage operations. The AC(O) also ensured coordination
and scrutiny. Before 1950 too many proposals and operations were being con-
sidered in isolation and pursued by separate bodies, thereby wasting time and
effort and creating poorly integrated policies.75 Despite the formation of vari-
ous mechanisms within the Foreign Ofªce, British ofªcials in 1949 reluc-
tantly acknowledged that the government had not yet established coordina-
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tion and central direction of Cold War programs.76 Regarding the ªasco in
Albania, for example, ofªcials conceded with hindsight that the operation was
hampered by a lack of thorough planning and scrutiny.77 The AC(O) was re-
sponsible for ensuring the necessary drive and coordination as well as for al-
lowing political, economic, and psychological operations to be coordinated by
a single organization.
As the number of proposals increased, however, ofªcials realized that ade-
quate scrutiny was beyond the capacity of the AC(O), which met only
roughly every four weeks. Jebb realized that his colleagues lacked sufªcient
time to sift through all the evidence and examine the proposed schemes in ad-
equate depth. Accordingly, some responsibility was delegated to another new
body, the Overseas Planning Section. One of its tasks was to “ensure that no
possible schemes for attacking Communism overseas went by default for want
of proper examination.”78 The Overseas Planning Section, which was closely
linked to MI6 and the Foreign Ofªce, sought to consider schemes proposed
to it and welcomed advice on “pitfalls to be avoided” from missions overseas.79
Strategic Sense
Through coordination and scrutiny, the pinprick approach made more strate-
gic sense than liberation. Liberation strategies were fundamentally ºawed and
doomed to fail from the outset. The use of émigrés—so integral to liberation
operations—was inherently unsound. Recent scholarship into the role of exile
organizations in strategy has argued that although states have traditionally
sought to use such groups as instruments of grand strategy, this task has often
proved problematic. As the British were realizing in 1950, political exiles are
instruments “of a special variety for they are instruments that are politically
distinct from the state that is trying to use them. They possess their own polit-
ical goals and their own respective strategic cultures. Because of this, states—
especially great powers—often discover that their use as grand strategic instru-
ments can become a very complicated affair.”80
Britain encountered this problem ªrsthand in Albania. Although observ-
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ers have traditionally blamed the notorious spy Kim Philby for exposing the
operation, recent scholarship has also pointed the ªnger at loose-lipped and
often bickering Albanian émigrés, both in the refugee camps of Turkey, Italy,
and Greece and within the Committee for Free Albania in Paris. This les-
son was not lost on MI6. Senior intelligence ofªcers lamented how the Alba-
nian government had learned about the impending inªltration two months
before the landings.81 When British ofªcials were reviewing their approach to
covert operations in 1950, they ruled out the use of émigrés in covert anti-
Communist programs, describing them as “impracticable”—too risky, too
provocative, and lacking in plausible deniability.82
The liberation strategy was also doomed because political warfare alone
was inadequate to roll back conventional Soviet military power from Eastern
Europe. Neither the British nor the Americans were prepared to commit their
own conventional forces to back up the resistance movements and secure the
objective.83 This strategic problem was raised by Arthur Tedder, the UK chief
of the air staff, when discussing Operation Valuable in Albania. Although a
strong advocate of covert action, Tedder expressed concern that such activity
should not be considered in isolation and had to be gauged in the context of
future overt warfare. Special operations needed to be followed up by direct
military action in order to have real value.84 Not doing so was a potentially se-
rious, and even fatal, strategic ºaw. Although (owing to the dangers of escala-
tion and later the Soviet nuclear bomb) direct military action was never an
option, Tedder’s point was ofªcially recognized by the Foreign Ofªce in Janu-
ary 1952. Senior diplomats acknowledged that liberation operations could
not succeed without Western powers simultaneously neutralizing the Soviet
armed forces by engaging either in armed intervention or in some diversion-
ary action elsewhere. Such a strategy could have succeeded, if at all, only once
the West had attained overwhelming military superiority over the Soviet
Union in order to prevent escalation to major open warfare.85
Britain’s covert planners had hoped that the internal security services of
the East European states would not be as strong as those inside the Soviet
Union itself. Learning from the failure in Albania, the members of the AC(O)
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swiftly concluded that the security forces throughout the Soviet bloc were
“inªnitely more powerful than any previous organisation in history” and that
the UK lacked experience in countering them.86
The pinprick approach made more strategic sense. It was more cautious
than earlier operations and was thus less likely to spark escalation and Soviet
retaliation. This was in no small part because of the Foreign Ofªce’s domina-
tion of covert operations and diplomats’ crafty ability to use the AC(O) to
outmaneuver the military in pursuing Cold War policies. The committee was
chaired by a senior diplomat, and Foreign Ofªce ofªcials outnumbered their
Ministry of Defence counterparts. Moreover, the pinprick approach made
more sense because it was reasonably cost-effective insofar as operations
started off on a small scale and were only gradually expanded if successful.
Finally, the approach was generally compatible with overt British foreign pol-
icy. For covert operations to be successful in both the short term and the long
term, they must have a harmony of objectives with traditional diplomatic
maneuvers.
Overt-Covert Alignment
Prior to 1950, Britain had a muddled approach to covert operations. Those
responsible for generating proposals were forced to stumble blindly forward
in the absence of clear policy guidance from top levels. Jebb and his colleagues
had to trawl through a series of ministerial statements just to work out what
the policy actually was. After rereading a host of transcripts ranging from
Attlee’s broadcasts from Chequers to Stafford Cripps’s contributions to House
of Commons debates, Jebb could deduce only what policy “appear[ed]” to
be.87 The only area in which explicit guidance existed was propaganda.88
Accordingly, liberation operations became inconsistent with the broader
foreign policy framework at the time. Since the Berlin Blockade of 1948–
1949, Bevin’s priority had been to work with the United States in containing
the Soviet Union. He referred to this as “holding the rim,” by which he meant
preventing the Communist land masses of the Soviet Union and China from
expanding any further than they already had.89 How offensive liberation oper-
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ations ªt into this broader, seemingly defensive strategy is unclear. With mini-
mal policy guidance, both U.S. and British ofªcials found their rhetoric dis-
connected from policy.90
Initially, the advent of the AC(O) went some way to ensure that clandes-
tine schemes were better integrated into broader anti-Communist policies.
The committee, initially at least, was seemingly not limited to covert opera-
tions (although these took priority). Instead, it was able to take a somewhat
more holistic approach by considering a range of measures, including, for ex-
ample, encouragement of governments in the Middle East to take legislative
and administrative action to combat Communism and the tightening of visas
and travel restrictions of colonial students traveling to Prague.91
Action directed against East Germany as part of the pinprick scheme was
consistent with Britain’s broader foreign policy. British policy included efforts
to strengthen the democratic institutions inside West Germany and to foster
economic and cultural life that would ensure popular afªnity with the West.
This, ofªcials hoped, would entice Czechoslovakia to follow suit.92 The onset
of the Korean War in 1950 intensiªed this effort. Because Western politicians
believed that the Soviet Union had instigated the war, they feared that the
same thing might happen in Europe; speciªcally, that East Germany might
try to unify Germany by force. The Western response was to promote the in-
dependent status of West Germany and allow it to accede to a plethora of in-
ternational organizations. Regarding East Germany, Bevin, along with Kon-
rad Adenauer and his French and U.S. colleagues, quickly resolved to ignore
the East German Socialist Unity Party (SED) and regard the Soviet Union as
the real authority, imposing a diplomatic blockade against East Germany in
late 1949.93
Meanwhile, covert action was employed to chip away at Communist and
Soviet control in the East by splitting the ranks of the SED, discrediting min-
isters, and spreading distrust between Soviet and East German authorities. To
alleviate fears of an East German invasion of the Federal Republic, the AC(O)
authorized covert efforts to undermine Soviet conªdence about the loyalty
and efªciency of the East German police. This action was speciªcally de-
signed to “reduce the possibility of [the police] being used to attack the West-
ern sectors of Berlin or the Federal Republic.”94 Similarly, in keeping with the
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diplomatic blockade of East Germany, covert action primarily targeted the
Soviet occupying forces, who were seen as the real authority. Action against
the SED and East German police was often undertaken with the impact on
the Soviet authorities ªrmly in mind.95 The overt and covert strategies com-
plemented each other and were again acknowledged in the 1952 policy dis-
cussions when the PUSC emphasized the importance of covert action used
“pari passu” with an overt policy of negotiation from strength.96 The well-
deªned pinprick approach therefore made sense and, unlike liberation, was
properly managed, coordinated, and scrutinized.
Available archival records suggest, however, that this was short-lived. By
the mid-1950s, the AC(O) was heavily criticized (and ultimately abolished)
for being too limited to propaganda and covert operations, which, according
to Norman Brook, encouraged a “compartmental view.” The committee
tended to see covert action as a thing in itself rather than a “servant” of policy
and to overstate what could be achieved through covert means. Ofªcials wor-
ried that the covert tail was wagging the overt dog.97 Planners in the Foreign
Ofªce later concurred that the AC(O) was deemed “competent to concern it-
self only with covert aspects of policy and hence could not ensure that its co-
vert and overt aspects were properly coordinated.”98 Accordingly, they argued
that covert subversive action needed to be better integrated into the political
departments of the Foreign Ofªce and missions abroad.99
Unfortunately, the bulk of the AC(O) ªles beyond 1950 remain classi-
ªed. Two tentative conclusions about the 1950s can be drawn, however. First,
covert operations apparently became increasingly disconnected from policy as
the 1950s progressed. This may be because the AC(O) met less frequently
as the decade advanced and because it lacked any ministerial direction after
Attlee was voted out in 1951. The AC(M), created by Attlee to oversee covert
operations at the ministerial level, did not meet at all under the Conservative
government. Churchill and his successor, Anthony Eden (who, like Churchill,
was a keen supporter of such activity), evidently preferred an informal ap-
proach to covert operations and opted not to use committee structures.
Second, a covert strategy seems to have fallen by the wayside and been re-
placed by ad hoc and opportunistic operations. Eden issued a prime ministe-
rial directive in the autumn of 1955 reasserting a British covert operations
25
The Pinprick Approach
95. Ibid.; and AC(O) Minutes, 1 March 1950.
96. “Future Policy towards Soviet Russia,” 17 January 1952.
97. Brook to Eden, 21 October 1955, in TNA, PREM 11/1582.
98. “Overseas Planning Committee and Political Intelligence Group,” January 1958, in TNA,
FO 371/135610, SC(58)6.
99. Ibid.
strategy. He stressed that “counter-subversion is an instrument of policy, not
an end in itself. It is usually subsidiary to the main, overt, means by which
policy is pursued.” Owing to the various constraints, such as fear of provoca-
tion and escalation, the prime minister switched the focus of covert opera-
tions away from Eastern Europe. He argued that “we should not attempt any
major campaign of counter-subversion action against Communist-occupied
countries.” Instead, the highest priority became the Middle East and South-
east Asia, where such activity was to be increased.100
Ultimately, the AC(O) was disbanded in February 1956.101 Its horizontal
representations of decision-making were replaced with what was described as
a more “vertical” approach whereby responsibility for covert operations
abroad was transferred to the Foreign Ofªce (which oversaw MI6).102 Vertical-
ization, or the move toward reliance on traditional departmental structures,
was intended to integrate covert policies better into the traditional framework
of overt policymaking and to enhance ministerial responsibility and authority.
The new structure also sought to strengthen the Foreign Ofªce’s hand against
its rivals in the Chiefs of Staff.
Containing the Military
The AC(O) played a useful function in containing the belligerent military. A
key, if cynical, function of the committee was to serve as a forum in which the
Chiefs of Staff could air their views and be made to feel as though they were
having input.103 As Norman Brook later bluntly put it, the military chiefs
continued to engage in pointless “sniping.” Brook felt they still saw “covert
activities in isolation from policy,” overestimated the potential for covert ac-
tivity, and even showed signs that they would like to control MI6.104 Their
views had to be contained by the cabinet ofªce, including through the
AC(O). The committee scrutinized and discussed various proposals and was
careful to ensure that only the more cautious ones with a reasonable chance of
success were sent up to the prime minister and his most senior colleagues for
approval. The far more aggressive proposals were weeded out at committee
stage even though the proposals had been endorsed by the Chiefs of Staff.
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This pattern increasingly frustrated the military, and by the middle of the
decade senior ªgures expressed exasperation at AC(O) caution and Foreign
Ofªce intransigence. They sought to “get cracking” with special operations
and grew increasingly frustrated by what they perceived as slow progress. By
contrast, John Ward, the Foreign Ofªce chairman of the AC(O) in the mid-
1950s, preferred a “more cautious approach” and was “irritated” at the mili-
tary’s gung-ho back-seat driving. Ward, and by extension the AC(O), was
forced to act “as a brake rather than accelerator on the Committee ma-
chine.”105 The diplomats and the military continued to battle over the owner-
ship of Cold War policy.106
Conclusions
Conceptualized as the pinprick approach, Britain’s pursuit of covert opera-
tions evolved in late 1950 and 1951. Under the guidance of the newly created
Ofªcial Committee on Communism (Overseas), key features of the approach
included numerous operations of limited scope and with limited objectives
designed to chip away at Soviet power in the East European states by exploit-
ing weaknesses and sowing the seeds of disaffection. The strategy was cau-
tious, involving experiments and pilot schemes in political, economic, and
psychological warfare—but not sabotage.
Although the new approach was less ambitious than the earlier liberation
operations, there was some continuity of covert activity throughout the Attlee
years. Coordination with the United States, for example, was a constant, as
was the importance of propaganda. Similarly, the British proclivity for pilot
schemes was integral to the pinprick approach but can also be seen in the
failed operation in Albania. The grandiose objectives of Operation Valuable
in Albania were to be attained gradually and incrementally, by testing the wa-
ters and advancing if conditions seemed propitious.107
Although Whitehall’s inherent caution frustrated U.S. ofªcials, this was a
more coherent approach than the liberation schemes. Reacting to the failures
in Albania, the AC(O) attempted to provide a coherent framework for pro-
posals to undertake covert actions behind the Iron Curtain and beyond.
Moreover, the bringing together of ofªcials from relevant departments im-
proved the levels of scrutiny afforded to proposals for such action. The
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107. “Policy Towards Albania,” 21 March 1949, in TNA, FO 800/437.
AC(O) did, however, create a Whitehall debate that lasted throughout the
Cold War—and indeed remains relevant today.108 Should mechanisms for
the stimulation and coordination of covert activity be horizontal or verti-
cal? The AC(O) represented a horizontal approach whereby representatives
from the relevant departments came together to discuss and scrutinize pro-
posals. The committee was initially successful and oversaw the launch of a co-
herent wave of covert activity behind the Iron Curtain in late 1950 which
seemingly complemented British overt policymaking. Moreover, the AC(O)
worked well in containing the military’s demands for a more aggressive ap-
proach. Ultimately, however, an interdepartmental Cabinet Ofªce mecha-
nism was always going to be divorced to some extent from traditional foreign
policy processes. As this was becoming increasingly apparent, military sniping
escalated, and the committee was deadlocked by the middle of the 1950s.
Although verticalization allowed for greater integration with traditional
departmental processes within the Foreign Ofªce, abolishing the AC(O) re-
duced scrutiny and eroded a check against covert action. An interdepartmen-
tal committee ensured that other interested ofªcials could scrutinize proposals
and examine potential implications and blowback. Vertical channels reduced
opportunities to challenge departmental assumptions and biases before action
was approved by the foreign secretary or prime minister. It is therefore not
surprising that the mid–1950s is remembered as a time of unregulated British
covert action—an era of robber barons within MI6.109 The balance between
policy coherence and adequate scrutiny is difªcult to achieve.
This has been only a preliminary assessment of the workings of the
AC(O). Much more research can and will be done as more of the committee’s
ªles are declassiªed in coming years. Even the fragmentary ªles now available,
however, yield remarkable insights into the British approach to covert opera-
tions in 1950 and 1951. After the muddled thinking from 1946, including
the disaster in Albania, Whitehall began to develop a more coherent and con-
sidered approach. Covert operations did not decrease toward the end of
Attlee’s regime. Instead, the AC(O) helped developed a pinprick strategy that
was tentative, incremental, and run by a committee—a very British approach
to covert action.
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